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I. Introduction
In 1981, South Korea was the world's fourth largest debtor country and in
the midst of an economic crisis. She had accumulated $17.6 billion of debt
within three years, raising her debt stock to $32.1 billion and her debt/GDP
ratio to 49 percent. Output had declined by 4.8 percent in 1980, compared to
average growth rates in excess of 9 percent during 1970—1979. Inflation had
doubled from 14.4 percent in 1918 to 28.7 percent in 1980.
Korea's adjustment to the 1979-1962 debt crisis has been remarkable. By
1986, she had substantially reduced the debt burden. Inflation had fallen to
just three percent, while the government budget deficit had been cut in half.
Exports grew by 15 percent. fueling a 12.5 percent increase in output, and a
current account surplus nearly 5 percent of GNP. At the same time, real
wages, per capita income and consumption all increased, and the country
maintained historically high levels of fixed capital formation.
In stark contrast, the 1986 world Development Report (p. 54) describes
the plight of seventeen of the middle income debtor countries as follows:
"The bulk of the adjustment has been undertaken through lower
demand, which has meant, in practice, reducing imports and
investment... .GOP has stagnated since 1980, and per capita incomes
have declined substantially. . . .Vet the main indicators of debt at
the end of 1985 were close to their previous peaks. Despite their
adjustment efforts, these countries seem to be as far as they ever
were from reconciling growth and credit worthiness."
The purpose of this paper is to summarize the findings of an in depth
analysis of Korea's macroeconomic performance, policy and prospects, with
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primary focus on the experience with external debt.1 The paper begins with an
overview of Korea's experience. Four questions arise from our summary:
1. What caused Korea's debt crises?
2. bow was Korea able to achieve rapid, successful recoveries?
3. What role has external borrowing played in the experience?
and 4. Are there lessons for other debtor countries?
Answering these questions involves synthesizing a number of interrelated
factors. In ection III, we summarize our conclusions about each of these
pieces individually. Section IV puts the pieces of the puzzle together and
examines the implications, answering questions 1—3. The final sections
discuss the lessons to be learned and the prospects for Korea.
It. Overview of Macroeconomic Experience
Korea's macroeconomic history can be divided roughly into five periods.
The early period, from 1945 to 1953, was one of continued disruption. First
came the division into North and South Korea at the 38th parallel after World
War II. The South was left with rich agricultural lands and light
manufacturing industries, but almost no heavy industry or power facilities.
Attempts to begin economic recovery were interrupted by the devastation of the
Korean War which is estimated to have killed over one million people and
destroyed over one third of South Korea's physical capital.
Another development during this period, with lasting implications for
Korean development, was a major land reform. During 1947—1949, farmland
previously owned by Japanese landlords, was either redistributed or sold,
dramatically decreasing the concentration of land ownership. This development
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is perhaps the most important factor in explaining the relatively egalitarian
distribution of income in Korea.
The second period, (1953-60) was one of slow recovery, financed by
massive foreign aid, primarily from the United States. Foreign aid inflows
averaged nearly US $300 million per annum during 1955—59, reaching 16 percent
of GNP in 1951. Inflation rates jumped to 60 percent immediately following
the War, while output growth remained moderate. Under the complex system of
trade restrictions erected by the Syngmari Rhee dictatorship, exports grew by
only 1.3 percent per year.
In contrast, the third period, from 1950—73, saw a dramatic economic
turn—around fueled by rapid rates of export growth. Exports grew by 40—50
percent per year during 1960—74 while output grew by 10 percent during
1965—74.
The economic transition coincided with a change in political regime and
economic policy. Syngman Rhee was forced to resign in 1960 after a student
uprising. The new government, led by Chang Myon, collapsed in May 1961
following a military coup led by General Park Chung Nec, who remained
President of Korea until a second coup in 1979.
Under General Park, Korea switched from an import—substitution strategy
to an active export-promotion strategy. The first of a series of Five-Year
Plans, initiated in 1962, identified investment and export—led economic growth
as the number one priorities. Other hallmarks of the strategy were extensive
government intervention in domestic and international capital markets, the
development of close links between government and industry, import
liberalization and the more active use of exchange rates to maintain
compet it i veness.
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Table I
Korea's External Debt, j960-85
(million of U.S. dollars)
Debt 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1957 1968 1969
total Foreign 83
Debt
89 157 177 206 392 645 1,199 1,800
Foreign Direct —
Investment
1 3 5 16 21 34 49 56
Foreign Debt/GNP 3.9 3.8 5.8 5.2 6.9 10.7 15.1 22.9 27.2
Foreign Debt Plus 3.9
Direct
Investment/GNP
3.9 5.9 6.4 7.4 11.3 15.9 23.9 28.0
Debt Service 8.5
Ratio1
0.6 1.0 2.6 5.0 3.2 6.4 5.4 8.5
(continued)
Debt 1970 1971 1972 1913 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Total Foreign 2,245
Debt
2.922 3,569 4,257 5,933 8,443 10,520 12.649 14,823
Foreign Direct 81
Investment
117 175 329 486 549 650 741 830
Foreign Debt/ONP 28.7 31.2 34.0 31.5 32.0 40.5 36.7 33.8 26.5
Foreign Debt Plus 29.7
Direct
Invest.ent/GNP
32.4 35.6 31.0 34.6 43.1 38.9 35.8 30.1
Debt Service 10.6
Ratio
21.0 18.7 14.8 14.4 14.4 12.1 11.1 13.9
1lncludes interest on short—term debt.
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Table 1 (continued)
Korea's External Debt, 1960—85
(million of U.S. doflars)
(continued)
Debt 1919 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1985
Total Foreign 20.287
Debt
27,170 32,433 37,063 40,378 43,053 46,762 44,510
Foreign Direct $66
Investment
873 975 1,044 1,112 1,222 1,456 1.691
Foreign Debt/GrIP 32.5 45.0 49.0 53.5 53.1 52.3 56.3 46.8
Foreign Debt plus 33.9
Direct
Investment/GNP
46.5 50.4 55.0 54.6 53.7 58.0 48.8
Debt Service 16.3
Ratio
18.5 20.1 20.6 18.8 20.1 21.4 ——
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Foreign aid inflows fell dramatically during the period. During 1960-64,
they averaged $210 million per year, over ten times the average annual
accumulation of external debt. This inflow dropped to $110 million per year
during 1955-69, just one-third of the average annual debt accumulation, and
only $28 million per year during 1970—74, or 0.03 percent of the debt
accumulation. Foreign aid to Korea had essentially ended by 1915.
Gross fixed investment was raised from 15 percent of GNP in 1965 to 26
percent in 1969 (Table 2). To finance the investment, declining foreign aid
flows were replaced by increased reliance on external borrowing and by
increased domestic savings. Firms (especially exporters) were given strong
incentives to borrow abroad. A system of loan guarantees substantially
reduced the risks and the real cost of borrowing abroad was negative.
External debt jumped to 27 percent of GNP by 1969.
Difficulties emerged during 1970-12. As growth slowed, domestic savings
dropped, increasing the current account deficit and reducing Korea's debt
service ability. A devaluation to stimulate exports exacerbated repayment
difficulties for externally indebted firms. The government bailed them out.
and continued to pursue its investment strategy, combined with further
depreciation and some monetary and fiscal restraint. Taking advantage of
strong world demand, exports grew by 90 percent in 1973, stimulating a record
16 percent output growth, a spurt in domestic savings and pulling Korea out of
the first period of debt difficulties.
The fourth period (1973-70) includes a second period of rapid debt
accumulation, economic difficulty and recovery (table 3). It also coincided
with a major shift in econosic strategy -— a renewed industrialization,
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table 2
Major Economic Indicators
1964—65 1966—67 1968—69 1970 1971 1972 1973
GNP Growth Rate 7.1 9.7 12.3 -— 9.1 5.3 14.0
Export Growth Rate 42.1 35.4 39.5 34.2 27.8 52.1 96.6
Inflation (CPI) 16.1 11.0 15.5 15.9 13.5 11.7 3.1
Current Account (%GNP) 0.3 —3.7 -8.1 —7.7 -6.9 —3.5 —2.3
Fixed Investment (%GNP) 0.2 0.2 0.3 24.7 22.5 20.4 23.2
Domestic Savings (%GNP) 0.1 0.2 0.2 0,2 0.2 0.2 0.2
P42 Growth Rate 33.8 61.7 66.7 27.1 20.8 33.8 36.4
Budget Deficit (tGNP) -— —— -- 1.6 2.3 4.6 1.6
Growth Rates:
Noninal Wages 20.3 19.9 30.6 26.9 16.2 13.9 18.0
Real Wages 1.6 8.1 16.9 9.3 2.4 2.0 14.3
Labor Productivity
Valued added 2.9 3.9 13.3 22.3 13.9 5.0 5.0
KPC index' 13.2 10.9 23.2 12.7 9.6 8.8 8.8
Terms of trade 84.6 97.1 101.0 100.0 99.2 98.7 93.7
Real Effective 116.7 104.3 98.0 100.0 105.6 114.1 132.5
Exchange Rate
Won/S 263.0 269.0 282.0 310.6 347.2 392.9 398.3
1Fron Korea productivity center, output per production worker.
Note: National income data prior to 1970 are based on 1975 constant prices, old
SNA. 1970-73 data are based on new SNA.
Source: Economic Planning Board and Bank of Korea.
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coupled with increased government intervention.
The "Big-Push" was a massive investment program in heavy and chemical
industries, initiated in 1973 because policy makers feared that Korea's
comparative advantage was shifting away from light industry. The program
coincided with a resurgence in inflation, a slowdown in export growth, a rise
in the incremental capital—output ratio and a deterioration in the
distribution of income. Import restrictions and credit rationing increased.
In addition the exchange rate was fixed (1975-79) and allowed to appreciate in
real terms. Although widely viewed as a policy mistake, some of the
investments (steel and autos) have begun to pay off.
Economic growth again slowed during 1974-5 in the aftermath of the oil
price rise. Domestic savings again dropped, increasing the borrowing
necessary to finance the investment program. Korea elected to "borrow her
way" through the crisis so as to fulfill planned investment and to relax
monetary and fiscal policies. As world demand recovered during 1976-78, high
growth rates resumed raising domestic savings and improving the debt
position.
In 1979, Korea again underwent a shift in economic strategy. Motivated
by concern over rising inflation rates and economic distortions from the Big
Push, a new stabilization plan included monetary and fiscal restraint plus the
gradual reduction of price controls, import restrictions and financial market
interventions.
However, 1979-82 were years of crisis for Korea. In 1979, the
assassination of President Park together with a disastrous agricultural
harvest and the second oil shock all contributed to a severe economic and
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Table 3
Major Economic Indicators
(1973—76)
1973 1971 1975 1976 1977 1978
GNP Growth Rate 14.1 8.5 6.8 13.4 10.7 11.0
Export Growth Rate 98.6 36.3 13.9 51.8 30.2 25.5
Inflation (CPI) 3.10 24.3 25.3 15.3 10.1 14.4
Current Account (%GNP)
—2.3
—10.8
—9.1
—1.1 0.0
—2.1
Fixed Investment (%GNP) 23.2 25.6 25.3 24.4 27.3 31.3
Oomestic Savings/GNP 22.8 19.9 19.1 23.9 27.5 28.5
112 Growth Rate 36.5 24.0 28.2 33.5 39.7 35.0
Budget Deficit/GNP 1.6 4.0 4.6 2.9 2.6 2.5
Growth Rates,
Nominal Wages 16.0 35.3 27.0 34.7 33.8 34.3
Real Wages 11.3 8.8 1.4 16.8 21.5 17.4
Labor Productivity1
Value added 5.0 2.4 2.2 2.4 10.3 12.6
KPC index 8.8 11.4 11.6 7.5 10.5 11.9
Terms of Trade 136.2 110.9 100.0 114.1 122.0 121.9
Real Effective iii.i 101.1 100.0 93.6 94.6 97.8
Exchange Rate
Won/$ 398.3 404.5 464.0 484.0 184.0 484.0
1From Korea Productivity Center. Output per production worker.
Note: Based on new SNA method.
Source: Economic Planning Board, Bank of Korea.
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political crisis in 1960. The military assumed effective control of the
country in May 1980 under General Chun Doo Hwan. He was elected President in
1981 and his term is due to end in 1988.
The poor 1979-92 performance is documented in Table 4. Output stagnated,
actually declining during 1980. As domestic savings plunged, the current
account deficit mushroomed, financed by massive external borrowing. Korea
accumulated over $22 billion of debt during 1979-82, raising the stock to 53.5
percent of GNP.
During 1980-81, the exchange rate was devalued, however the stance of
monetary and fiscal policies alternated. Korea continued to borrow heavily to
maintain investment. By 1982, growth was still low by Korean standards (5.4
percent) and exports stagnated, but inflation and the current account deficits
had fallen significantly. The government initiated a more expansionary policy
to stimulate growth.
As world demand recovered and the terms of trade improved during 1963-84,
Korea again underwent a remarkable economic recovery. Growth rates spurted.
Savings rose reducing the current account deficit. Authorities responded to
the 1985 slowdown in export growth as world demand stagnated with 6 percent
real depreciation in 1985, a further 15 percent real depreciation in 1986.
By 1986, the economy was booming, inflationary difficulties had been
resolved and there was a substantial trade surplus. In contrast to many of
the other large Third-world debtor countries currently negotiating
rescheduling arrangements with their creditors, Korea not only met all debt
service obligations, but was In the position to actually reduce her debt stock
by $2.25 billion.
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Table I
Macroeconomic and Policy Indicators for Korea: 1978-56
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1954 1985 198?
GNP Growth Rate1 11.0 '7.0 —1.8 6.6 5.4 11.9 6.5 5.4 12.5
Export Growth Rate 26.5 18.4 16.3 21.4 2.8 11.9 19.6 3.6 14.6
Inflation (CPI) 14.4 18.3 26.7 21.3 7.2 3.4 2.3 2.5 2.3
Current Account (%GNP) -2.1 -6.8 —8.8 —7.0 —3.8 —2.1 —1.7 —1.1 4.9
Fixed Investment (%GNP) 31.3 33.2 32.3 28.7 30.5 31.3 31.3 30.8 31.3
Domestic Savings (%GNP) 28.5 28.1 23.5 23.5 21.0 27.9 30.3 30.7 34.8
M2 Growth Rate 35.0 24.6 26.9 25.0 27.0 15.2 7.7 15.6 18,6
Budget Deficit (%GNP) 2.5 1.4 3.2 4.7 4.1 1.6 1.4 1.0 1.8
Growth Rates:
Nominal Wages 34.3 28.6 22.7 20.1 14.7 12.2 8.1 9.9 9.1
Real wages 17.' 8.7 —4.7 —2.6 6.9 10.1 5.7 7.3 6.7
Labor Productivity
Value added 12.6 16.0 —3.9 11.1 —1.8 1.2 12.0 —0.8 7.6
KPC index 11.9 15.9 10.6 15.1 7.8 13.6 10.5 7.1 13.6
Terms of Trade 117.8 115.3 100.0 97.9 102.2 103.1 105.3 105.9 111.7
Real Effective 109.0 97.2 100.0 103.6 103.2 110.5 114.4 121.2 139.2
Exchange Rate
Won/S 481.0 484.0 607.4 681.0 831.1 775.8 605.0 870.0 861.5
1From Korea Productivity Center. Output per production worker.
Note: Based on new SNA method.
Source: Economic Planning Board. Bank of Korea.
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III. The Pieces
A. External Debt
Foreign capital inflows have played a critical role throughout Korea's
recent development. The preceding discussion has already emphasized the
importance of foreign aid in the decade following the Korean War and
documented the rapid accumulation of external debt, concentrated during
1965—69, 1974—75 and 1979—82.
Rapid growth of output and especially exports has meant that Korea's
actual debt burden grew much more slowly than the nominal debt stock.
Although the debt (denominated in U.S. dollars) grew at an average rate of
34.6 percent in the eighteen years from 1964 to 1982, the debt to GNP ratio
reached 53.5 percent, while the ratio of debt service to exports reached only
20.6 percent. Korea ranked only eleventh in terms of her Debt/GOP ratio and
fifteenth in terms of her debt service ratio.2 Korea's growth performance is
a key piece of the puzzle surrounding the quick adjustment to the 1979-B? debt
crisis.
External borrowing in Korea was used primarily to finance current account
deficits. In particular, there has been little capital flight. This points
to an analysis of domestic savings and investment as the key to explaining
debt accumulation, because the current account deficit, or foreign savings,
finances the portion of investment not financed domestically.
It is also notable that Korean debt has been carefully monitored by the
Ministry of Finance since the borrowing began in the early 1960$.
Applications for loans must be approved, and the government has actively used
the allocation of foreign (and dc,mestic) credit as part of an Industrial
policy, providing growth incentives for particular industries and firms.
—13—
Borrowing is a central component of Economic Planning in Korea. In many
periods, the amount of borrowing required to finance desired investment was
forecast quite accurately, however unexpected external and internal
developments during 1974-5 and 1979-81 meant that the forecast turned out to
be a sizable underestimate. In any case, the Korean government has maintained
excellent debt statistics thro2hout the period. It was not faced with the
additional difficulty of faulty or incomplete information in responding to the
1979-SO crisis.
B. Economic Growth
Korea's phenomenal growth rates since 1965 have been well documented. Of
particular significance is that Korea was able to avoid the dramatic slow-down
which most of the other fast growers experienced after the first oil price
shock. A detailed analysis of the economic sources of Korea's growth
identifies fixed capital accumulation as the central factor.
During the 1960s. Korean growth is attributable to a combination of
increased factor accumulation, improved resource allocation, economies of
scale and technological improvement. Fixed capital accumulation accounts for
1.1 percent average annual growth during 1963-72. In contrast, capital
accumulation accounts for a growth rate of 2.6 percent during 1973-82. Korea
offset reductions in factor productivity after the first oil shock with a
substantial increase in investment.
Increased labor has also played a key role. The average work week
increased throughout the period to 54.8 hours, placing Korea at the top of the
International Labor Organization's list. Furthermore, the work force is
well-educated and disciplined.
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It is interesting to point out that the sources of Korean growth are
quite different from the sources of Japanese growth during her 1953-71 rapid
acceleration period. Factor accumulation explains only 45 percent of the
Japanese growth rates as compared to 60 percent of the Korean growth rates.
A decomposition from the demand side identifies exports as the "engine of
growth" during 1975-85, as well as during the earlier period. It is important
to stress the role of exports because, as mentioned above, exports generate
the foreign exchange essential to repaying external debt.
Investment demand has also been consistently strong. However, since
import requirements for investment ranged from .36 to .48, investment has been
only a moderate source of demand for domestic output. Finally, we point out
that government consumption has played at best a minor role.
The data also document that labor productivity has consistently grown
faster in the manufacturing than in the nonmanufacturing sector. The domestic
price of manufactured goods -- a proxy for the "tradeable goods sector" --rose
relative to the price of other —- nontraded -- goods throughout the 1960-85
period. However this real appreciation has represented technical progress and
not a deterioration in external competitiveness or a reallocation of resources
away from the production of tradeables.
One of the most enviable aspects of Korea's recent recovery has been
trade balance improvement combined with growth. In contrast, most debtor
countries have achieved trade surpluses through recession induced reductions
in imports. In fact, the very low income elasticities of Korean imports
during 1961-83 are unusual by Korean standards. They are explained in large
part by disastrous harvests during 1978—80, necessitatIng a surge In food
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imports, followed by a very favorable harvest during 1981-2 which both raised
domestic output and reduced imports. Exports did not begin to recover (in
value terms) until 1983, and this turnaround is explained by a combination of
increased world demand, a terms of trade improvement, the lagged impact of a
real depreciation and numerous investments targeted to export industries
gradually coming on stream.
C. Investment and the Five-Year Plans
Korea instituted a series of Five-Year Economic Plans, beginning in 1962,
The first step in the formulation of these plans has been to determine the
investment required to achieve a desired rate of growth. Thus, investment for
growth has been the number one priority, while external borrowing emerges at
the other end as the residual -- the gap between investment and available
domestic financing. In the mid 1950s, it was an important supplement to
declining foreign aid. More recently it has been used to substitute for
shortfalls in domestic (especially household) savings.
The Plans identify particular sectors of the economy for growth with
overwhelming focus on exports. Furthermore, the government has actively
controlled the allocation of credit, thereby playing a key role in determining
the industrial concentration of capital accumulation,
Even the best plan will have little impact if it can not be implemented.
A large part of the success of the Five Year Plans is attributable to Korea's
centralized decision making combined with a very close link between government
and business. Authorities maintain current data, including information about
individual firms performance. Decisions are made quickly, and policies are
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pragmatic, often involving direct intervention at the firm level. One
implication of this approach has been that, by selecting previously successful
firms to undertake new projects, the government has helped to create a number
of large conglomerates (chaebol) and a highly concentrated industrial
structure.
0. Savings Behavior
Korea's savings rate has risen from 14 percent in 1965 to over 34 percent
in 1985, however, the remarkable secular increase has been interrupted
periodically. These plunges have accelerated foreign borrowing so as to
finance desired rates of investment, leading to a "crisis".
Two aspects are especially notable. First, savings declines are
primarily attributable to drops in household savings, and not to deteriorating
government budgets. Second, current account improvement during the adjustment
has not been brought about by cuts in investment to close the gap. Instead.
the key has been the recovery of household savings, supplemented by increased
government savings.
Disaggregation shows that both the secular rise and the plunges occurred
in the household sector. The performance is explained quite well by a model
in which the marginal propensity to consume is higher out of permanent income
than out of transitory income. Thus, Korea's strong growth, leading to upward
revisions in permanent income, accounts for the secular rise in savings, while
growth slowdowns account for the 1970-11, 1975 and 1980—el plunges, as
households reduced savings to smooth consumption. Although interest rates are
estimated to affect savings positively, we do not find the estimates to be
significantly different from zero.
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E. Exchange Rate Policy
Overall, Korea has followed a consistent, credible exchange rate policy,
maintaining a competitive, sometimes undervalued, real exchange rate with low
variance. In adjusting to external imbalance during both 1974 and 1980, the
policy packages included a substantial (20 percent) one shot devaluation in
addition to an exchange rate regime change.
The nominal exchange rate was fixed to the U.S. dollar during 1975—79,
during which time authorities did permit a 14 percent real appreciation.
Since 1980, the exchange rate has been continually adjusted vis a vis a basket
of currencies. The real exchange rate depreciated by 6 percent ;ring
1980-82, and by a further 14 percent during 1982—86. There has been gradual
appreciation during 1987.
F. Wages and Competitiveness
Even more striking than Korea's success in maintaining external
competitiveness throughout most of the 1955-86 period is the fact that real
depreciations were often (e.g., 1973, 1983-86) accompanied by real wage
increases. Again, rapidly increasing labor productivity is the key to the
puzzle, providing a wedge which can be split between increased competitiveness
and increased real income.
During 1965—72. real wages grew at an average annual rate of 9.0 percent
while productivity (using the value added measure) grew by 14.4 percent.
However, during 1973—79, real wages grew by 12.5 percent, outpacing the 11.1
percent productivity growth. Shortages in skilled labor associated with the
Big—Push towards heavy industrialization, led to rapid nominal wage gains.
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Unit labor costs, measured in dollars, grew 2.3 times as quickly for Korea
than for Taiwan, a major competitor in third markets.
It is important to point out that real wages declined both at the outset
of Korea's export led growth and as Korea reestablished her competitive
position after the 1976—79 real appreciation. During 1960-64, the average
annual real wage decline was 1.96 percent, despite 7.46 percent productivity
growth. Real wages fell at the beginning of the adjustment (1981—2) with all
of the productivity gains going to reduce unit labor costs. This, plus
exchange rate depreciations dramatically improved Korea's competitive position
since 1982.
We note a few other characteristics of Korea's labor market, Worker
organizations are extremely weak. There is evidence that they have increased
job security, but not that they have influenced wages. Bonuses average 15
percent of employee compensation, which enhances flexibility. Finally, the
fact that wages are not indexed to past inflation rates has meant that
inflation shows little inertia.
0. Trade Policy
Korea's switch from a policy of import substitution to one of export
promotion during 1960-64 is well known. However, despite the liberalization
of many import restrictions, trade policies continued to play a central role.
In particular, tax preferences and interest rate subsidies became important
mechanisms to subsidize domestic industries after 1965. Through the mid
1970s, export incentives were maintained with little variability. Subsidies
were used to compensate exporters during periods of real appreciation.
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Import restrictions increased during the Big Push and have been gradually
relaxed since 1980. Quantitative restrictions, domestic content and other
regulations have remained critical, so that tariff rates substantially
underestimate the degree of protection. For example, the share of
manufactured items subject to import restriction jumped from 34 percent in
1968 to 61 percent in 1978. These restrictions have been important in
developing "infant industries" such as automobiles and steel allowing Korea to
become competitive enough to begin exporting these products. The restrictions
help to explain why almost all Korean imports are raw materials, intermediate
products or capital goods, with consumer products amounting to less than 5
percent of Korean imports.
Korea also stands out in not maintaining a structure of protection which
penalizes agriculture. The political economy of that outcome is clearly
linked to the relatively equitable income distribution due primarily to the
land reform.
H. Industrial Policy
Korea has been extremely successful in selecting "growth industries", and
in managing the industrial transition for these infant industries. A large
Dart of the success lies in the development of credible, comprehensive
strategies in which investment projects to promote exports formed the
cornerstones of Five Year Macroeconomic Plans.
Korean businesses targeted for expansion have not been concerned about
oolicy inconsistencies or government policy reversals. They have been given
referential access to domestic credit, to external funds and to imported
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materials. The government has maintained its commitment, bailing out firms
threatened with bankruptcy during downturns or financial panics. It has also
created a few conglomerates which are enormous, even by world standards.
In retrospect, some of the policies were mistakes -— particularly during
the 1974—79 Big Push. For example, government intervention led to substantial
overcapacity in petrochemicals. However, the entire policy should, by no
means, be written off as a mistake. Many of the investments in heavy
industries are beginning to pay off and exports of these products are growing
rapidly.
I. Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy in Korea is perhaps most notable for the role it did not
play in accumulation of external debt. Government savings has been positive
in every year since 1962.
The budget deficit (which includes public investment as an outlay) has
been kept under control, ranging from 1 percent to 4 percent of output. A tax
reform arid switch to value added taxation in the alas did succeed in raising
revenues from 15 percent to 18 percent of GNP. Large deficits in 1975 and
1980—81 are attributable primarily to increased expenditures in the Grain
Management Fund. Social expenditures, such as education and housing, have
been low historically, but rising over time. Since 1980, they have amounted
to 30 percent. Indicators of fiscal stance show that fiscal policy has been
counter cyclical, used by the government in attempts to "fine—tune" economic
performance.
Overall, fiscal deficits have not been financed through rapid money
creation. The deficits themselves have been relatively small. Also
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authorities have alternated between domestic and foreign credit. For example.
after jumps in the banking sector credit to the public sector during mo-si,
net credit was reduced during 1982-84.
.3. Monetary Policy
The banking system,.including the Bank of Korea, has been monitored by
the Ministry of Finance since 1962 so that macroeconomic policy making is
extremely centralized, We highlight four aspects. The first is the key role
for credit allocation in the industrial strategy, as discussed above. A
second objective of monetary policies (especially interest rate adjustments)
has been to increase household savings. As discussed above, it is very
difficult to quantify how large a part this tactic has played in raising
savings rates.
Third, Korean financial markets have three levels. The official banking
sector is highly controlled, although therehas been some liberalization since
1982. including the privatization of five commercial banks. There is also a
partially controlled nonbank financial sector, and an unorganized curb market.
The latter two have added flexibility to Korea's financial system, providing
credit (often at high interest rates) to those firms which were not given
access to scarce bank credit. Since a 1982 financial scandal, however, the
curb market has shrunk considerably. Nonbank financial institutions have been
growing rapidly, accounting for one half of all deposits of banks plus
nonbanks in 1985, as compared to one fifth in 1978.
Korea's financial system has been anything but a unified system in which
credit is allocated by market forces. While it is certain that the outcomes
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under such a system would have been different, it is very difficult to assess
whether they would have been "better" of "worse". To us. the most sensible
conclusion is that the Korean government successfully used an active and
pervasive policy of intervening in financial markets to promote its growth
objectives.
Finally, there has been some movement towards financial liberalization of
the banking sector. But unlike the trade liberalization, the changes so far
seem to have been greater on paper than in practice. Credit allocation
remains a cornerstone of Korean industrial policy.
K. Two Themes
Two unifying themes emerge from these ten pieces in the puzzle of Korea's
successful performance. The first is the importance of rapid growth rates
(particularly of exports), rising labor productivity and expanding human and
physical capital resources. These factors gave Korea the leeway to borrow
heavily while keeping the burden of debt repayments manageable and to avoid
squeezing real incomes when increasing international competitiveness. The
rapid productivity growth in export and import competing goods production has
eased the problem of mobilizing and transferring domestic resources so as to
pay external debts.
The second theme is the usage of active, interventionist government
policy which is credible, consistent and coherent. These policies placed
investment to promote exports as the number one priority and led the economy
through a fundamental industrial restructuring.
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IV. Implicat ions: A Synthesis
in this section, we synthesize the pieces discussed above in order to
answer the questions posed at the outset, The first question, important in
distinguishing Korea's experience from that of many other debtor countries, is
why the debt crises occurred.
Since 1165. Korea has been vulnerable to external and internal shocks
because of its determined investment policy which left no buffers between
desired investment and domestic savings. External borrowing was treated as
the buffer, or residual.
The country has been hit by a number of external shocks, in particular
oil price and interest rate changes, but the role of internal "shocks" must
not be underestimated. During 1974-5, terms of trade deterioration accounts
for only a part of the current account deficit. Like 1970—72, this period
seems better described as a slowdown than as an economic crisis. External
factors were more important during 1979-80. However, the cris.is would have
been much less severe if these had not been exacerbated by the agricultural
disaster, political turmoil and previous policy mistakes.
How was Korea able to recover so quickly from slowdowns and crises? We
believe the central factor has been successfully distinguishing between
permanent and temporary shocks, and responding appropriately. The devastation
of the Korean War was clearly a permanent shock. In designing and carrying
through the Impressive structural readjustment of the 1960s, policy, makers
learned hold to put together an adjustment package that worked.
They chose to embark on another structural readjustment during 1973-79
because of pessimistic forecasts for medium term growth on the 1950s
—24—
industrialization path. In contrast, Korea borrowed to smooth adjustment to
the 1973 jump in oil prices because the shock was judged unlikely to alter the
medium to long run prospects for heavy industry. However, policy makers have
not been rigid. A third shift in focus came as doubts emerged about the
efficacy of further heavy industrialization, and the economy found itself
saddled with the massive debts accumulated during 1979-80.
The point is closely linked to the role of external debt in Korea's
adjustment. The debt has been used to supplement domestic savings in
financing investment, enabling faster rates of growth. The debt has also been
used to smooth over temporary shocks, without jeopardizing the on-going
structural adjustment plan. However, Korea has been admirable in not using
external borrowing to avoid undertaking a structural readjustment.
What is the adjustment package that has worked for Korea? The
centerpiece has been a comprehensive export focused investment plan,
operationalized through competitive exchange rates, credit rationing, tax and
other incentives for targeted industries, trade policies and allocation of
external credit. Initial declines in real wages have helped to boost
competitiveness, but once the investment-growth cycle has been put on track,
productivity gains have been split between raising wages and enhancing
competitiveness.
Traditional macroeconomic "stabilization" tools -— monetary expansion and
fiscal deficits —— have been important in the passive sense that they have
been kept in line. Fiscal deficits have remained small and authorities have
been careful to limit domestic credit expansion to the public sector.
However, these policies played at best a supporting role in pulling Korea out
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of slowdowns and crises. Both were quite variable with many reversals during
1980-61. By the time a definite monetary/fiscal expansion emerged in 1982,
Korea was already well on the way to recovery.
Good fortune has also helped Korea to recover. In particular, the first
oil shock gave Korea an unexpected boost during 1976-76 through revenues from
construction in the middle east. The recent recovery was fueled by terms of
trade improvements beginning in 1981.
V. Lessons
We begin by pointing out two lessons which, most certainly, can not be
learned from the Korean experience. The first is how to design "short-run
macro-economic stabilization" packages. There are no "quick-fixes" in Korea's
recent history.
The second is the benefits of liberalized trade regimes and (domestic and
international) capital markets. Active intervention has been a mainstay of
Korean policy. However, there are numerous examples of extensive intervention
in other countries which have coincided with poor economic performance. Korea
does contain lessons about which types of intervention are likely to be
effective,
We draw four lessons from Korea's experience. A first lesson is the
value of credibility, consistency and coherence in economic policy. As in
Korea, this may well necessitate coordinated trade, industrial and credit
policies in order to promote infant industries. It certainly includes
maintaining a competitive .real exchange rate together with a sustainable
fiscal policy, and •oderate monetary gros'ith.
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A second lesson is the value of long term structural adjustment policy
with investment in exports as the top priority. When things have gone well in
Korea, high rates of investment have stimulated growth, raising both domestic
savings and export earnings and enabling Korea to finance the external debts.
When difficulties emerged, Korea consistently avoided cutting investment so
that the economy was poised to take resume growth when external and/or
internal conditions improved.
Of course1 the difficulty with such an investment program is that it must
be financed, and extensive borrowing can lead to repayment difficulties. The
Korean experience highlights the value of external borrowing in enabling an
investment policy to be carried through, as distinguished from external
borrowing used to avoid structural adjustment.
Finally, Korea's ability to recover from downturns emphasizes the value
of monitoring economic performance and maintaining accurate statistics for key
variables.
VI. ProsDects
The prospects for rapid growth to continue over the short to medium tern
are excellent. Our view is based both on Korea's recent good fortune
(especially the decline in oil prices and interest rates and the appreciation
of the Japanese yen) and on Korea's very competitive position as a result of
1985-6 real depreciations and the heavy investments over the past decade which
are beginning to pay off.
We look at two of the many policy issues facing the government. First,
some gradual real appreciation is unlikely to disrupt growth prospects, and
may well be important to mitigate protectionism in the U.S.
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Second. many have expressed surprise that Korea has decided to reduce the
external debt. There remain many high return investments. There are also
arguments for borrowing so as to take advantage of current favorable external
conditions through investment and stockpiles. On the other hand, Korea does
have a substantial external debt and reducing it will reduce the potential for
future debt crises. Furthermore, careful forward looking decision making has
been an asset in the past. Caution today may well pay off handsomely as
external conditions become less favorable down the road.
In addition to important social and political issues, there are two
difficulties facing the country. Continued access to especially U.S. markets
is critical to continuation of Korea's export led growth. Current efforts to
identify new markets for Korean products and to reduce dependence on the U.S.
are timely given the uncertainties about U.S. trade policy.
Finally, shifts in Korea's industrial mix have created a new domestic
policy problem -— how to respond to the difficulties of declining industries.
The options, involving distribution and efficient resource allocation, are
important and controversial. Thus, incorporating declining industries into an
industrial policy which has successfully targeted growing industries poses a
fundamental challenge to Korean econociic planning. Hopefully, Korea's
response will result in new lessons.
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Footnotes
1. Readers are referred to the detailed study for further discussion of
points made in this paper. The study also contains a comprehensive list of
references. A brief list is provided at the end of this paper.
2. These data, for 1983, are quoted from B. Aghevli and 3. Marquez-Ruarte,
Table 6, p. 21.
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